History of Tanzania to the Recent Past
POST COLONIAL TANZANIA: POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS AND IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION
INTRODUCTION
In this lecture we will survey the following issues like ,the Tanganyika and Zanzibar Union, single party system and democracy, theory and practice of socialism and self reliance its success and failures. Also we will cover foreign policy and international cooperation as well as Tanzania’s commitment to liberation.
OBJECTIVES
At the end of this lecture you should be able to:-
-discuss the union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar
-examine the social and political change in Tanzania after Independence
-discuss socialism and self reliance and why it failed in Tanzania
The union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar
The United Republic of Tanzania was formed on 26 April 1964 as a result of the Union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar. Julius Kambarage Nyerere became the first President of the United Republic of Tanzania and Sheikh Abeid Karume became the First Vice President of the United Republic of Tanzania and the President of Zanzibar and Chairman of the Revolutionary Council. The late Rashidi Mfaume Kawawa became the second Vice President of Tanzania and leader of Government business in the National Assembly.[2]
Like other African countries, the people of Tanganyika opposed and fought against colonial invaders from the very beginning. This included the formation of African Associations in both Tanganyika and Zanzibar. The African Association was established in Tanganyika in 1929. This association was transformed into the Tanganyika African Association (TAA) in 1948.
In 1953 under the leadership of Mwalimu Julius Kambarage Nyerere, TAA was recognised as a political party and was transformed into the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) in 1954.[3]
On Zanzibar’s part, the various football clubs established in the early 1930s provided the basis for the coming together of members of the African community. By 1934,members of the African community united in a formal organisation known as the African Association (AA). The formation of the Zanzibar Nationalist Party (ZNP) in 1955 forced leaders of the African Association and the Shirazi Association to unite. In 1957, the Shirazi Association and African Association united to form the Afro-Shirazi Party under the leadership of Sheikh Abeid Amani Karume.[4]
It is believed that the agreement for the unification of the two states was signed by the first President of Tanganyika, the late Mwalimu Julius Kambarage Nyerere, and the first Zanzibar President, the late Sheikh Abeid Amani Karume, on 22 April 1964, in Zanzibar. Although the Original Articles of the union does not exist, It was agreed that,to become valid The Articles of the Union must be ratified by both Tanganyika’s Parliament and Zanzibar revolutionary council,the Articles was ratified by Tanganyika’s Parliament on 26 April 1964 but was not ratified by the Zanzibar Revolutionary Council as per agreement.[5] On 27 April 1964, the leaders of the two countries exchanged legal documents of the Union at the Karimjee Hall in Dar es Salaam. The Articles of the Union declared the formation of the United Republic in Section 4.
Critics and Grievances pertaining union
Since its formation in 1964 under the Tanzania first President Mwalimu Julius Nyerere any discussion or debate concerning the union and its legality was never allowed in Tanzania and could lead to criminal charges to anyone who conducts such discussion or debate, that including Government officials, such person could be seen as an enemy of the Nation.
Knowledge and education about the union was never conducted and Tanzania citizen had no knowledge about the Union,its benefits and the reason of the union. The original Articles of Union which contain 11 matters was never existed and So often Zanzibar Government asked about it only to receive negative results.
In Private and Public funded Education,Union topic or history was never a part of it even in General studies and Civic studies. The only place where union matter appears is in the exams in the form of “When was the union formed?” And this led to number of critics and grievances since the Nyerere’s era to present. Second President of Zanzibar Aboud Jumbe was among the first public figure to fall on the trap.
In 1984 Jumbe and his colleagues, including his Chief Minister Seif Sharif Hamad, attempted to push for more autonomy for Zanzibar. As a result, Aboud Jumbe was pressured by the union government to resign his posts as vice president of Tanzania and president of Zanzibar in January 1984.
His Chief Minister, Seif Sharif Hamad was detained,and On January 1988 Unceremoniously dropped from the Revolutionary Council and dropped as the Chief Minister of Zanzibar, on May 1988 he was Expelled from the ruling CCM with six colleagues and automatically lost his parliamentary seat in the Zanzibar House of Representatives.
On May 1989 he was arrested and taken to court to face (politically motivated) trumped up charges of allegedly being found with government secret documents believed to be the Article of Union. From 1989–1991 he was Reprimanded in the Zanzibar Central Prison.[6]
Among the Critics including, between 1964 and 1973 in six other things – elements seen in 12 to 16 of the First Additional – were added to the list of Union Matters. Thus, in 1965 the issues of finance, currency and banking were added, in 1967 the manufacturing licences and statistics, higher education and what was in Annex X of the Charter of the East African Community was expanded, in 1968 was expanded to the natural resources of oil, petroleum and natural gas, and in 1973 issues of the National Examinations Council was expanded.
1984 addition of elements of Annex X of the Charter of the East African Community to create four independent list, transportation and aviation, research, weather forecast and data. Similarly, changes of Constitution had raised new thing on the list of the Union Matters: Court of Appeal of Tanzania. In addition, section 3, i.e. Defense, was amended to become ‘safety and security.’ And in 1992 ‘the registration of political parties’ was added to the list of Union Matters.
Also the issue of removing power to Zanzibar President to seize being the Vice President of Tanzania created a fierce debate[7] In addition, the Interim Constitution, 1965 that Dominant in Tanzania until 1977 passed the law of Annex II of the Constitution to make provision that the Act cannot be adjusted without amendment supported by two-thirds of all members of Tanganyika and Zanzibar.
Similarly, the Constitution specifies, in the First Additional, that any one of the legal changes requires support from two-thirds of all members in “Chapter 557 (Edition 1965), Laws of the Union Treaty Verification of Tanganyika and Zanzibar in 1964,but unfortunately all addition Matters of the union did not follow the law and were inserted locally.
Complaints from Zanzibar
Complaints from Zanzibar started before the assassination of Zanzibar first President Sheikh Abeid Amani Karume Snr. According to one of the first President of Zanzibar Revolution Council,Nassor Hassan Moyo,who was also a minister for many years in Tanzania the decision to Unite Tanganyika and Zanzibar was Nyerere opinion. Among the first thing Nyerere suggested to Karume snr.was to unite the two Countries and then came the articles of Union later on the creation of the Union constitution.[8]
In the 1970s Nyerere decision to send Soldiers from Zanzibar to fight liberation of Mozambique without Karume’s Knowledge was among the first clashes between Zanzibar and Tanganyika. Karume decision to return the Soldier caused Nyerere and Karume not to speak face to face from that day to the death of Karume,after three days Zanzibar revolutionary council met to decide the fate of the Union and prepared special request letter which contained five or six matters which was sent to Nyerere to change the list of the articles of Union,the list including Tanzania president should seek advice to Zanzibar president in any decision including Announcement of State of emergency,Police to be excluded in Union Matters,International relation should be equal and Each country should have its own Currency. Nyerere turned down the request and offer to postpone the discussion until future.
Single Political System in Tanzania
Tanzania as a democratic one-party state
September 1, 1986 at 12:32 am · Filed under Issue 25, Politics
In the elections to the Legislative Council of 1960, the first held on a common roll franchise, the Tanganyikan African National Union won all but one seat, Tanganyika therefore entered upon independence as a defacto one-party state. This remarkable result was due as much to the outstanding leadership of Julius Nyerere as to the unifying influence of a common cause. Soon after independence the opinion gained ground t hat the monopoly of power should be retained by TANU and should be confirmed in law by the independence constitution.
The origins of this opinion were diverse. The role of TANU as the undisputed leader in the campaign leading up to independence and its spectacular recognition in the polls encouraged the opinion that TANU alone possessed the ability to govern.
A desire to create a system of Government appropriate to African conditions and experience was no doubt stimulated by recollections of the tribal baraza and the habits of mind that went with it. And at a more self-interested level it was known that certain leaders having borne the heat of the day during the independence campaign saw the one party state as a ready means of perpetuating their own authority – wrongly, as later experience showed.
Beneath these immediate concerns lay an instinctive fear of organised dissension. Et is easy for us in our island kingdom to overlook the mature sense of nationhood that has emerged from centuries of our history and the wide areas of consensus which have furnished us with the conditions essential for two-party government. “It is evident” wrote A.J.Balfour, “that our whole political machinery presupposes a people so fundamentally at one that they can safely afford to bicker; and so sure of their own moderation that they are not dangerously disturbed by the din of political conflict.”
Tanzania can make no such assumptions. As the history of Nigeria, Uganda and even Kenya has shown, centrifugal tendencies can be strong and dangerous. Tanganyika was the creation, not of historical evolution but of the ambitions of the European powers in the nineteenth century.
For many years the only cohesion was that imposed by an alien administration. Even as the colonial period drew to a close, local and tribal loyalties often exerted a more dominant influence than the national interest. If Tanzania was to become something more than a geographical creation, positive steps were required to arouse a sense of common destiny.
It was the judgement of Tanzania’s leaders that a political system based on the interaction of party rivalries could undermine these efforts and endanger the unity of the infant state.
The decision to turn Tanganyika into a one-party state was made by the National Executive Committee of the Party and on the 14th January 1963 this decision was announced by President Nyerere. The President made known at the same time that he had been empowered by the National Executive Committee to appoint a Presidential Commission to consider the changes of the constitutions of the Republic and of the Party that might be necessary to give effect to this decision.
The Commission was appointed on 28th January 1964 and reported on 22nd March 1965. There were 13 members, two of whom were prominent Europeans and one Asian. The Commission invited written evidence and also took verbal evidence throughout the country. Its deliberations were guided by the terms of two important memoranda drawn up by President Nyerere and as a result the final report was deeply influenced by President Nyerere’s approach to the whole subject, an approach which, as it turned out, received widespread support during the course of the verbal evidence.
The Commission, following the President’s view, laid finally at rest the view that the party should be a small, elite leadership group and insisted that it should be a mass organisation open to every citizen of Tanzania. This decision finally established the character of TANU as constituting a national movement; indeed the word ‘party’, with its sectional implications, was no longer an appropriate description and the resulting pattern of Government, as Professor Pratt has suggested, “was in many ways closer to a no party system than to a one party system.”
It is clear from the evidence that this concept fully reflected the mood of the people, who showed no interest at all in entrenching an ideologically exclusive elite, but saw the necessity for a single national movement to emphasize and safeguard the unity of the nation.
In his guidelines to the Commission the President laid down a number of ethical principles, which later were incorporated in the constitution of TANU and survive in substantial measure in the present constitution of the Party (CCM). They are also reflected in the Union Constitution as amended in 1985, where Part 3 endows certain important rights and duties with the force of law.
The principles listed by the President relate to the fundamental equality of all human beings and their right to dignity and respect; the right to take part in government at all levels; the right of freedom of expression and movement, of religious belief and of association within the law, subject only to safeguarding the freedom of others to enjoy these benefits; the right of protection of person and property under the law and of freedom from arbitrary arrest, subject to a duty to uphold the law; the right to receive a just return for work by hand or brain; common
ownership of natural resources; the responsibility of the state to intervene actively in the economic life of the nation in order to secure the wellbeing of all citizens, prevent exploitation and such personal accumulation of wealth as is inconsistent with a classless society; and to fight against colonialism and work for African unity and international co-operation.
In proposing these guiding principles the President foresaw some of the abuses that might pass unchallenged in a single party system. The Commission considered these dangers with the utmost seriousness and as one result of their deliberations a permanent Commission of Enquiry was established to perform the functions of an ombudsman and enquire into allegations of the abuse of power.
The reports of the Commission show that- this function has been performed with considerable effect. The basic rights safeguarded in Part 2 of the constitution of TANU as amended also reflected the President’s proposals and acquired a certain legal status when the Party constitution was incorporated as a schedule to the Interim Constitution of the United Republic of 1965. In the Interim Constitution it was stated that ‘all political activity in Tanzania, other than that of the organs of state of the United Republic…shall be conducted by or under the auspices of the Party’.
This position was reaffirmed in slightly different terms in the Constitution of 1985, in which the leadership role of the Party was also extended to the conduct of parastatal organizations. In practice, this has meant party responsibility for general policy and for monitoring the implementation of policy. The Party is not itself an executive organ of government, but in the course of formulating policy it has access to the personnel and the documentary resources of the Government departments involved.
Subject to such guidance, the executive arm of Government was free to govern as best it could and the National Assembly to legislate, to vote money and to monitor the performance of Government. In practice the National Assembly has been slow to exercise its powers of criticism, though there have in recent years been signs of greater liveliness and self-confidence.
There have been a number of instances where Government proposals have been modified or rejected and one which led to the dismissal of a Minister and senior officials. The important consideration here is that protest is not organised on a Party basis and it is this aspect that makes the proceedings of the National Assembly so unfamiliar and puzzling. It is like Parliament without the whips.
The Tanzanian system is called a ‘one-party democracy’ and some may see this title as a contradiction in terms. In fact, however, the efforts made under the system to represent popular will are not negligible. Despite the limitation of candidature to two persons approved by the Party in each constituency, successive elections to the National Assembly have brought about widespread changes in membership, including the unseating of Ministers, and no leader can lay permanent claim to a position of leadership.
The choice of President allows only for a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ vote for a single candidate chosen by the Executive Committee of the Party and confirmed at a Party National Conference. But at least the right to vote ‘no’ has been freely exercised. In each national election hundreds of thousands of Tanzanians have voted against Nyerere (and in 1985 Mwinyi), whilst in 1985 no less than 41% of Zanzibari voters voted against the choice of Abdul Wakil as their President. While the tendency towards the formation of a ruling class is undeniable, it is not inviolable and there is constitutional provision which, it is hoped, will continue to be effective in safeguarding peaceful change.
Criticism of the one party system has recently come from no less a person than the Chairman of CCM himself, Julius Nyerere by then. In the course of his peregrinations around Tanzania he has found in party circles much slackness and indifference. With characteristic frankness he has admitted that in a multi- party system competition between p arties keeps them on their toes.
This was not a suggestion that Tanzania should abandon its one-party system, but that alternative methods must be found to stimulate and sustain political awareness and activity. Nyerere has long been conscious of this problem and said so in a speech in 1974: now he is face to face with it in practice. Since the Party is predominant in matters of general policy, in the election of a President and in the choice of candidates for the National Assembly, the comment is important.
The criticism has also been expressed that the one party system as operated in Tanzania may have had the effect of muting legitimate dissent. There is danger here of passing judgment on the basis of British experience, overlooking the absence of a tradition of informed discussion, the very recent achievement of widespread basic literacy and the extreme scarcity of newsprint.
Yet it is reasonable to wonder how far justifiable proposals for reform can accumulate support without the help of some kind of party machinery. It is noticeable that the important reform culminating in the Preventive Detention (Amendment) Act of 1984 seems to have been triggered, or at least promoted, by a symposium at the Faculty of Law in 1982, that is, outside the Party system.
This is not the same thing as the formation of an alternative party, but it does suggest that there may be limits to the ability of a one-party system to give hospitality to the serious advocacy of reform. If so, then changes will ultimately ensue. Under the one-party system the voice of the Party has great significance and therefore it is the modulation of that voice which is decisively important.
The present highly indirect system of election to the National Executive Committee may turn out to be the point at which reform is most needed.
Socialism and self reliance in Tanzania
The Arusha Declaration (Swahili: Azimio la Arusha) and TANU’s Policy on Socialism and Self Reliance (1967), referred to as the Arusha Declaration, is known as Tanzania’s most prominent political statement of African Socialism, ‘Ujamaa’, or brotherhood (Kaitilla, 2007). The Arusha declaration is divided into five parts: The TANU “Creed”; The Policy of Socialism; The Policy of Self Reliance; the TANU Membership; and the Arusha Resolution.
Part one of the Arusha Declaration, The TANU “Creed”, outlines the principles of socialism and the role of government:
- That all human beings are equal;
- That every individual has a right to dignity and respect;
- That every citizen is an integral part of the Nation and has a right to take an equal part in Government at local, regional and national level;
- That every citizen has a right to freedom of expression, of movement, of religious belief and of association within the context of the law;
- That every individual has a right to receive from society protection of his life and of property according to the law;
- That every citizen has a right to receive a just return for his labour;
- That all citizens together possess all the natural resources of the country in trust for their descendants
- That in order to ensure economic justice the State must have effective control over the principal means of production; and
- That it is the responsibility of the State to intervene actively in the economic life of the Nation so as to ensure the well being of all citizens and so as to prevent the exploitation of one person by another or one group by another, and so as to prevent the accumulation of wealth to an extent which is inconsistent with a classless society (Publicity Section, TANU, Dar es Salaam, 1967, p. 1).
The aims and objects of the Arusha Declaration are:
- To consolidate and maintain the independence of this country and the freedom of its people;
- To safeguard the inherent dignity of the individual in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;
- To ensure that this country shall be governed by a democratic socialist government of the people;
- To cooperate with all the political parties in Africa engaged in the liberation of all Africa
- To See the government mobilizes the resources of this country towards the elimination of poverty, ignorance and disease;
- To see that the Government actively assists in the formation and maintenance of cooperative organizations;
- To see that wherever possible the Government itself directly participates in the economic development of this country
- To see that the Government gives equal opportunity to all men and women irrespective if race, religion or status;
- To see that the Government eradicates all types of exploitation, intimidation, discrimination, bribery and corruption;
- To see that the government exercises effective control over the principal means of production and pursues policies which facilitate the way to collective ownership of the resources of this country;
- To see that the Government co-operates with other States in Africa in bringing about African Unity;
- To see that the Government works tirelessly towards world peace and security through the United Nations Organization (Publicity Section, TANU, Dar es Salaam, 1967, p. 2).
Part two of the Arusha Declaration focuses on socialism and some key features of socialism which include a policy of receiving a just return for one’s labour and the necessity for the leadership and control of major resources, services and government, to be in the hands of the working class.
In “a true socialist state no person exploits another, but everybody who is able to work…gets a his [or her] income for his [or her] labour” (Publicity Section, TANU, Dar es Salaam, 1967, p. 3). The “major means of production”, which the TANU identify as those resources and services which a large section of the population and industries depend, are “under the control and ownership” of the working class (Publicity Section, TANU, Dar es Salaam, 1967, p. 3).
It follows that a democratically elected government of the people is an essential component of socialism (Publicity Section, TANU, Dar es Salaam, 1967). The policy of socialism, the TANU posits, “can only be implemented by people who firmly believe in its principles and are prepared to put them into practice” as well as “live by the principles of socialism in their day to day life” (Publicity Section, TANU, Dar es Salaam, 1967, p. 3-4).
Part three of the Arusha Declaration espouses the importance of national self-reliance and debates the nature of development. Asserting that “A poor man does not use Money as a Weapon”, the Arusha Declaration identifies the heart of economic struggle:
“We have chosen the wrong weapon for our struggle, because we chose money as our weapon. We are trying to overcome our economic weakness by using the weapons of the economically strong – weapons which in fact we do not possess. By our thoughts, words and actions it appears as if we have come to the conclusion that without money we cannot bring about the revolution we are aiming at. It is as if we have said, “Money is the basis of development. Without money, there can be no development” (Publicity Section, TANU, Dar es Salaam, 1967, p. 5).
Secondly, no amount of money, whether it is accrued through taxation, foreign aid or private investment, will ever be enough to achieve the development targets and independence needs of a nation (Publicity Section, TANU, Dar es Salaam, 1967). The essential and true nature of development is this: “The development of a country is brought about by people, not by money. Money, and the wealth it represents, is the result and not the basis of development.”
In addition to people, the prerequisites of development are land, good policies and good leadership and the necessary condition and root of development are the hard work and intelligence of the people (Publicity Section, TANU, Dar es Salaam, 1967).
Part four of the Arusha Declaration, TANU Membership, stresses the importance of leadership’s commitment to the principles and objectives of the TANU and that “above all, the TANU is a party of Peasants and Workers” (Publicity Section, TANU, Dar es Salaam, 1967, p. 19).
This good leadership principle bleeds into Part five of the Arusha Declaration which states the role of government in this ideology to take action and steps to “implement the policy of Socialism and Self-reliance” (Publicity Section, TANU, Dar es Salaam, 1967, p. 20).
and Ujamaa:
Tanzania‘s
Development
Strategy
by J. H. J. Maeda
Ibrahim M. Kaduma
Since independence, the cornerstones
of Tanzania’s development
phiolosophy have been freedom
equality and justice. These principles,
however, were not effectively
articulated in strategy and policy
until 1967, when the Arusha Declaration-
was promulgated. Experience
had shown that Tanzania had made
the same mistakes as many other
countries in supposing that growth
plus regulation of a basically private
sector were consistent with either
greater equality or planned structural
change. Thus in the Arusha
Declaration^ was stated explicitly
that ‘The,development of a country
is brought about by people, not
by money. Money, and the wealth
it represents, is the result and not
the basis of development. The four
prerequisites of development are
different; they are: People, Land,
Good Policies, Good Leadership.”
This statement’ . implied that
Tanzania would now rely primarily
on maximum utilization of her
own resources for development.
Hence the country’s philosophy of
socialism and self-reliance.
With 14 million people, large
tracts of arable land and ample
resource potential, Tanzania should
be able to rely on itself to a very
large extent. This does not imply,
however, a desire to live in isolation.
On the contrary, the principles
of international collaboration and
solidarity are subscribed to by
Tanzania, but with the proviso
that co-operation must be on the
basis of equality and in pursuit of
balanced mutual benefits, in which
each country is free to .shape its
own destiny.
One of the developing countries attempting a development strategy carved out
of their own experience is Tanzania with its concept 0/Ujamaa. 7%i J article based
on a paper by J. H. J. Maeda and Ibrahim M. Kaduma of the Institute of
Development Studies, Dar es Salaam describes this interesting experiment.
the basis of Tanzania’s development
Since the overwhelming majority
of Tanzania’s population lives in
the rural areas, success in achieving
the country’s .goal of socialism
and self-reliance will be determined
by the extent to which the peasants
understand, accept and formulate
the policy’s implications. Ultimately,
this means, the creation of the
necessary institutions at the local
level.
A policy paper entitled ‘Socialism
and Rural Development’ was
issued by President Nyerere in
1967 outlining the structual reorganization
to be introduced in
the rural areas to begin the transition
towards the Arusha Declaration’s
goals. The paper calls upon
.the peasants to organize themselves
into viable socio-economic and
political communities. These are
the ‘ujamaa villages’ intended
to transform production that is
private and scattered into communal
and planned production.
Ideally, the ujemea villages are
to be socialist organizations created
by people who decide of their own
free will to live and work tcgether
for their common good governed’
by those who live and work in
them. The peasants form these
villages either in existing traditional
communities or more typically by
moving into unused land or regrouping
scattered homesteads to
establish new ones. The. villagers
are required to own, control and
run at least some of the economic
activities in their villages ccrr.munally,
and to organize productive
activity on that basis.
As socialist and democratic living
and working communities in
which the members are responsible
to themselves, the ujimaa villages
are governed by members, jointly
making their own decisions on
all issues of exclusive concern to
the village. They are expected to
own and run their communal farms
and other projects such as shops,
flour-mills, pre-primary and primary
schools, dispensaries, and cultural
and recreational activities. The size
of an ujamaa village depends upon
the lana avaikbleand the number of
people in each village ranges from
50 to 4.C00, although 5C0 to 2,5C0
is. normally viewed as the desirable
village size. There exists no standard
pattern of organization to be
followed by all ujemea villages—
a deliberate attempt to ensure that
each ujamaa village is organized
in a way compatible with its environment
and to encourage creative
local planning.
The constitutions of various
ujemea villages, however, show
similar features in their political
orientation and orgsnizatic nal structures.
Frcm these, as well as from
the general guidelines issued by the
Prime Minister’s oflice (pertly on
the basis of early experience), and
under whose framework most recent
village constitutions have been drawn
up, the main objectives of most
ujcmaa villages are • distinguishable:
To engender ideolcgical awareness
among members, organize
total opposition to exploitation
in any form, and create,
instead a sense of communal
spirit in working tcgelher for
the benefit of all members.
To give employment epportvnities
to every member of the
village, thus enabling each to
earn a just income.
To expand the socialist economic
uncertakings of the village by
the establishment of ccn.munal
farms, shops, incuslries and
commercial and service activities.
To market all the products of the
village, including those frcm
private plots.
30 ECONOMIC REVIEW, SEPTEMBER 197$
Avoidance of exploitation and
excessive differentiation in
wealth, income and power.
Better utilization of rural labour
to raise productivity potentially
obtainable through groups
of peasants working together.
Realization of this potential
requires specialization of functions,
division of labour, work
discipline and strong leadership
to guide the enthusiasm
of group activity into productive
channels.
Economies of scale in purchasing,
marketing, provision of
services (schools, health care
etc.), and some field operations
requiring mechanization.
Openness to technical innova-
. tions, through increase in scale,
and readier access to farmer
education.
Raising the socio-economic standards
of the peasants and consequently
reducing the socio
economic gap between rural
and urban people.
Facilitating national planning
overall goals and decentralized
implementation.
Mobilization of the masses for
both their development .and
the defence, of their country.
Establishing a new pattern of
human settlements (including
knowledge, finance, marketing
and transport as well as health,
water and education).
remained virtually impossible for
more dispersed populations. Therefore
in 1973 the TANU Congress
set a 1976 target date for
enabling everyone in rural areas
to live in a permanent and planned
village.
Thus, since 1973, there has been
a national drive to move the scattered
rural population either into vjcmaa
villages (for those who so wished)
or to. ordinary planned villages (for
those who are not ready to start
ujamaa living).Movement to villages,
therefore, is now compulsory,
while the transformation of a village
into an ujamaa village is still,
and likely to continue to be,
voluntary. It is hoped that many
of the benefits expected to be accrued
from living in an ujamaa
village will also prevail in an ordinary
planned village.
By June 1974 at least 2.6 million
peasants (of a total of about
10 million) were members of over
5,000 ujamaa villages. After the
1974 village system campaign, it
was established that upto 80 per
cent of the peasant population were
resident in planned villages, about
1.5 million in old non – ujamaa
villages, 3.0TO 3.5 million in ujamaa
villages and 2.5 to 3.5 million in
new non-ujamaa development villages.
Public-sector assistance, while
seen as supportive, has been large.
In 1974/75 education, health, housing,
agricultural extension and inputs,
transport and other expenditure
diretly related to the village
exceed 5C0 million shillings (4 per
cent of total GDP.)
To buy or construct. buildings,
offices, machines’ and other
necessary equipment for the
development of the village.
To co-operate with other ujcmaa
villages or para-statal institutions
in commercial undertakings
provided, that such cooperation
does . not run contrary
to the common good.
To give the villagers an opr
portunity to receive adult and
primary education, medical
treatment, pure water, improved
housing and other
essential services necessary for
an adequate material standard
of living and fuller human
development.
To be an example to Tanzanians
who are not members so that
they can see the benefit of the
ujamaa way of living.
Management of the villages
Overall responsibility for running
the afiairs of the village is
vested in a general meeting composed
of all villagers. The meeting
is normally held four times a
year. A two-thirds majority is required
to change the constitution or
to dismiss a member or members
and a simple majority for other
business, including annual village
plans and budgets.
The day-to-day management of
the village lies with the village executive
committee elected by the
general meeting. The committee is
required to meet once every month
and a village may set up specialized
committees with advisory, executive
or operational authority.
Results expected
There are several short-and longrun
benefits that are expected to be
derived from successful implementtion
of the ujamaa village programme.
Among these are:
The creation of self-reliant and
self-determining communities
following the tenets ‘of the
Arusha Declaration. National
self-reliance is impossible with
out deep-rooted self-reliant com
munities at the local level.
Creating communities which
can relateeffectively to government
officials and councils fol
lowing the 1972 decentralization
of most governmental functions
directly affecting
individuals.
Between 1968 and 1973 ujamaa
village formation exceeded party
and government expectations. The
record also showed that provision
of supporting Services and especially
adult education (1974-75 • enrolment
was about 3.5 million) could
be expanded rapidly in villages but
Implications of the village system
policy on international cooperation
From the foregoing, three things
may have become evident from
the point of view of international
cooperation.
The village is intended to be the
economic base for rural planning
and implementation. Selfgoverning
villages must be involved
in deciding what outside
resource transfers they
should recieve and on what
terms.
ECONOMIC REVIEW, SEPTEMBER 1975 31
1
Projects at the village level will
be basically small-scale ones directly
responsive to local initiatives and
resources, and implementation
capacities.
Although village communities require
technical and material assistance
at least during the initial
phases, their most important role
is one of self liberation, psychological
as well as material. Therefore,
‘assistance’ which is ideologically
antagonistic to participation and
socialism is inefficient in terms of
village goals and thus unacceptable.
With regard to international
cooperation and ujamaa village
development the international
community will have to accept the
decentralized, participatory and
socialist nature of the village and
not seek to use ‘assistance’ to reverse
it.
An interim assessment
What can be said of the results of
the ujamaa programme to date?
The human settlement pattern has
been transformed from one
dominated by scattered homesteads
and hamlets to one of more compact
communities.
Access to basic health, adult education,
primary education and communication
facilities has greatly im
proved. Access to skills within the
village community (not simply to
outside skilled agents) is increasing.
Access to directly productive
knowledge and inputs has improved
somewhat but is hampered by inadequate
central and village resources
and inadequate communication
and control patterns between
villages and ‘experts’.
Food production effects to date
are marginal—though probably
positive – because weather and
relocation dificulties have im
posed costs, and reorganisation
has taken time. Access to food
has improved; the change in
settlement pattern, for example,
was useful in identifying and
meeting deficits during the
1973-75 drought.
Mistakes have been made at
village, regional and national
levels, both in poor technical
planning and the partial substitution
of exhortation and.
coercion for education and
participation, but more notably
these have usually been
identified and rapid corrective
measures have been taken,
e.g. by TANU’s central committee
in October 1974 following
peasant criticism of aspects
of some regions’ village – system
programmes.
Communal action has risen rapidly
with regard to infrastructure, new
economic activities (e.g. shops,
dairy herds, small workshops) and
new crops, but less in respect of
staple foods and traditional cash
crops, which are largely grown on
individual plots.
Egalitarianism has progressed
within villages – private plots
are unequal in size but not
radically so, especially when
compared to those in some
non-ujemaa rural enclaves.
Participation within villages has
broadened and the degree of
rural elite control fallen. The
villages have often been able
to exert far more influence on
the post-1972 decentralized government
structure than peasants
could apply to the elitedominated
cooperative unions
or the agents of central govern
ment bodies during the preujamaa
period.
Village self-reliance has been unequal
both in terms of goals and
of achievements but has risen
in many cases This is linked
to a parallel decline in clientage
exemplified by a much more
assertive and self-assured pattern
of relationships, with government
and party officials.
Peasant ideological development
has begun, especially in the
realization that basic needs can
be met and that they must
mobilize pressures and support
for party and government
agents and institutions to safeguard
and build on results to
date. Adult education and improved
communication have
led to broader and deeper
individual and community consciousness
in a signifies nt number
of villages, even ii it may be
fair to question the present
degree of clarity and elaboration.
Each of these assessments is a qualified
one-individual cases of total
failure or regression, authoritarianism
of clientage can be found. Each
represents a state ol transition, not
arrival. Tanzania, like China, sees
the full achievement of socialist
rural communities and of a socialistic
rural society as a goal requiring
time, evolution and sequences of
priorities.
To attempt more than an interim
assessment would be to distrort.
Tanzanians do not claim to have
achieved participatory, self-reliant,
socialist development but to have
begun the long tansition to it. They
do not claim that the ujamaa
village core of another rural development
is complete but that it has
begun to emerge. The participatory
nature of the transition forbids lay- –
ing down detailed patterns for the
year 2C00 as opposed to evolving
sequences and programmes within
the strategic framework. The 1967-75
record is one of significant change to
wards another form of development.
Basic needs—food, habitat, water,
mass education, health, the utilisation
of surpluses to increase provision of
essentials are central to economic
strategy. The quest for self-reliance
does inform major village, regional,
national and international policies.
Inequality of income and- of access
to basic services has been reduced
rapidly both by redistribution and
increased production. Participation
and decentralization have moved
very far from the colonial, authoritarian,
bureaucratic starting-point,with an increasingly socialist andparticipatory mass party in centralof strategicand basic policy decisions. To claim more does a disserviceto Tanzania. Claims of totalsuccess and absolute certainty as to the future are part of the old’, authoritarian, technological, growth mystique. ‘Mistakes are mistakes'(to quote Mwalimu Nyerere) and the ability to recognize, correct and learn from them is an integral part of the Third World’s development perspective.
32 ECONOMIC REVIEW, SEPTEMBER I97S
Failure of Socialism and self reliance in Tanzania
Eventually a number of factors contributed to the downfall of the development model based on the Ujamaa concept. Among those factors were the oil crisis of the 1970s, the collapse of export commodity prices (particularly coffee and sisal), a lack of foreign direct investment, two successive droughts, and the onset of the war with Uganda in 1978, which bled the young Tanzanian nation of valuable resources. By 1985 it was clear that Ujamaa had failed to lift Tanzania out of its poor economic state; Nyerere announced that he would retire voluntarily after presidential elections that same year.
Tanzania foreign and international cooperation and commitment to Liberation
The Presidential Circular No. 2 of 1964 issued by our
Founding President, the late Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere, set
Forth the fundamental principles and objectives of the URT’s
Foreign policy. Since then, the conduct and content of the
Foreign policy has been guided by those principles and
Objectives, which include, inter alia:
The defense of freedom, justice and equality;
Safeguarding sovereignty, territorial integrity and
Political independence of the United Republic of
Tanzania;
The support for the struggles against colonialism, racism and neo-colonialism;
The support for the oppressed people in the world;
The promotion of African Unity;
The promotion of the respect for the principle of noninterference
in the internal affairs of other states;
The support for the practice of the policy of nonalignment movement (NAM)
The support for the United Nations in its search for
International peace and security;
The Promotion of Good Neighbourliness.
Achievements:
Having a foreign policy grounded in principles and with
specific objectives, enabled the United Republic of Tanzania
to engage effectively on the diplomatic scene since its
independence. Its consistency of view, and having the
courage to stand for what is right, also enabled the URT to
emerge as an active player in world affairs, exercising
diplomatic influence and authority far in excess of its
economic capability. Whether in decolonization, the struggle
against racism and apartheid, the defence of the principle of
social equality and for the rights of nations and peoples, in
fostering unity and solidarity especially of Africa and the
developing countries generally, or in promoting the policy of
non-alignment, URT emerged as a dynamic player on the
World scene.
SUMMARY
In this lecture we have surveyed the Union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar which led to birth of Tanzania, and single political system which started 1965, theory and practices of socialism and self reliance in Tanzania its success and failure and last part was the foreign policy and international cooperation and commitment to liberation.
ACTIVITIES
1. Discuss the reason for union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar
2. Do you think the union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar is still valid?
3. Examine the aims of socialism and self reliance of Tanzania
4.Discuss the reason for failure of socialism and self reliance in Tanzania
Topic 20
THE RECENT PAST-POLILITCS AND ECONOMY
INTRODUCTION
In this Lecture we will examine the market economy from 1986 onwards and political liberalization which will include the wind of change and the re-establishment of multiparty system in Tanzania.
OBJECTIVES
At the end of this lecture you should be able to:-
-Examine the market economy of Tanzania from 1986
-Discuss the implications of political liberalization in Tanzania.
Market Economy from 1986 and onwards
After negotiations with the IMF on a standby arrangement loan failed in 1979,
Tanzania launched its first self-guided National Economic Survival Program (NESP)in 1981. The objective of this program was the conditional liberalization of the economy, and it superseded the fourth five-year plan; however, the NESP basically retained the existing economic regime. In 1982 the government adopted three-year SAP, prepared with the cooperation of the World Bank and based on the advice of the Tanzanian Advisory Group. This SAP was an exclusively national effort, that is, a homegrown SAP, without any World Bank or IMF financial support. At first, the SAP did not result in any significant changes in Tanzania’s economic perfor-mance because the government was reluctant to implement the policy measures. It was not until fiscal year (FY) 1984/85 that Tanzania launched its first significant reform aimed at liberalizing the economy. The reform package contained the fol-lowing main policy measures (Taube 1992; Wenzel and Wiedemann 1989):
• Agricultural producer prices were raised by 46–55 percent.
• Cooperation unions for crop marketing were reintroduced.
• The Tanzanian shilling was depreciated by 40 percent.
• The nominal government budget deficit was frozen at the prior year’s amount.
• Government wages were raised by an average of 30 percent.
• Domestic trade of food products was liberalized.
• Consumer price subsidies for maize were eliminated.
• The Own-Fund Import Scheme, which allowed imports purchased with foreign currency deposited abroad, was initiated.
Although the international donor community welcomed these measures as afirst step in the right direction, they only marginally affected overall economicper-formance. Consequently, the international organizations increased their pressureon the Tanzanian government to take further action and pursue a stricter coordina-tion of its economic policies.
Structural Adjustment, Political Liberalization, and Economic Performance after 1986
This section first highlights the evolution of Tanzania’s SAPs from 1986 until the present and then describes economic performance and the sectoral policies applied under structural adjustment. In addition, Appendix Table A.1 presents selected country data that provide a number of economic and social indicators relevant to this section.
Evolution of Structural Adjustment Programs from 1986
In the wake of political changes in 1985, when Ali Hassan Mwinyi becamepresi-dent after the 24-year rule of Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere,
17the new government
Mwalimu is the Kiswahili word for teacher, which was President Nyerere’s original occupation but became a
respectful form of address for him.
12adopted a three-year ERP (1987/88–1989/90) as announced in the 1986/87 bud-get.
The ERP’s medium-term objectives were a positive growth rate in per capita
income, a GDP target growth rate of 4.5 percent, an inflation rate below 10 percent in 1989/90, a fiscal government deficit below 13 percent of GDP, an adjustment of the exchange rate toward an “equilibrium” exchange rate in mid-1988, positive real interest rates by mid-1988, an increase of between 30 and 80 percent in nominal producer prices for cash crops, and decontrol of domestic prices over a period of three years. During the course of the ERP, Tanzania obtained an 18-month standby arrangement with the IMF in August 1986Multisector Rehabilitation Credit from the IDA and donor governments in November 1986.
Furthermore, Tanzania became eligible for the rescheduling of loans in the so-called Paris Club, including the postponement and cancellation of existing principal and interest in October
1986. Finally, in July 1987, under the Structural Adjustment Facility, the IMF approved a 67.9 million Special Drawing Rights (SDR) loan in support of the ERP.
As discussed by Taube (1992), the Tanzanian ERP of 1986/87–1989/90 re-flects the theoretical debate on macroeconomic stabilization and structural adjust-ment in the 1980s. It had a medium-term horizon, and it aimed not only at outward orientation and monetary stability, but also at economic growth issues. The pro-gram tried to avoid excessive stabilization and aimed instead at expansionary stabi-lization and adjustment for growth.
The objectives of the ERP were incorporated in the 1988/89–1992/93 five-yeardevelopment plan and were reinforced by the Economic and Social Action Program(ESAP) in 1989. Within the scope of the two programs, the government strove for ageneral reduction of state controls and the promotion of private sector activities. In this context, it declared the rehabilitation of key infrastructure components a priority to support future economic development, especially transportation facilities like roads,
railays, and ports. The economy initially responded positively with an average annual GDP growth rate of around 4 percent during 1986–94. However, during its second term
(1990–95), the Mwinyi administration showed a much lower commitment to reforms, which led to deteriorating macroeconomic management, worsening macroeconomic performance, and instability.
In reaction, the IMF, World Bank, and most bilateral donors sharply reduced their support, suspended payments for development projects
The RP documentation specifies four general objectives:
(1) increase the output of food and export crops by providing appropriate incentives for production, improving market structures, and increasing the resources available to agriculture;
(2) rehabilitate the physical infrastructure in support of directly productive activities;
(3) increase capacity utilization in industry by allocating scarce foreign exchange to priority sectors and firms; and
(4) restoreinternal and external balances by pursuing prudent fiscal, monetary, and trade policies (URT 1986).
In particular, 64.2 million Special Drawing Rights (SDR) through the IMF; US$100 million through IDA; and US$50 million provided by the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.
The section mainly draws on Appendix 1 in Wenzel and Wiedemann 1989.
Annual inflation, measured as a GDP deflator, increased from 21.8 to 25.3 to 40.6 percent during 1990–92;
exports of goods and services at constant 1995 U.S. dollars declined from US$643.1 million in 1989 to US$592.4
million in 1990, US$385.4 million in 1991, and US$353.4 million in 1992; imports increased by 3 percent annu-
ally during the same period; and GDP at factor costs experienced an 8.4 percent decrease from 1991 to 1992.
13and balance of payments assistance, and refused any further financial assistance (World
Bank 1999a). The first presidential and parliamentary multiparty elections in November 1995confirmed the majority of the ruling CCM and elected President Benjamin Mkapa. The Mkapa government immediately approached the IMF to revive Tanzania’s eco-nomic reform efforts of the late 1980s, which first resulted in Tanzania’s acceptanceof the obligations of Article VIII, Sections 2, 3, and 4 of the IMF Articles of Agree-ment, effective from July 15, 1996.
By signing Article VIII, Tanzania regained the confidence of the international donor community in its serious commitment to pursue sound economic policies. In November 1996 the IMF approved a three-year credit under the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (
new ERP for 1996/97–1998/99.The new ERP emphasized fiscal performance andstructural reforms, namely:
• building administrative capacity for improving development management;
• maintaining a stable fiscal stance and using public resources more efficiently;
• promoting the private sector by deregulating investment and divest parastatals;
• providing greater support for primary education and basic health care;
• supporting the development of basic infrastructure, especially to give im-petus to rural agricultural development;
• restructuring the financial sector to respond to the needs of the private sec-tor (World Bank 1999a).
The ongoing ERP is well under way, and the third and last tranche of the ESAF
credit was disbursed in February 1999. The IMF and other donors have expressed their
satisfaction with recent economic developments in Tanzania, especially considering the
negative effects of the 1996/97 drought and the 1997/98 El Niño floods. During their
Article IV consultations with Tanzania in February 1999,
IMF executive directors
“commended the Tanzanian authorities for their steadfast implementation of prudent
macroeconomic policies and progress in structural reforms during the past three years
The first local multiparty elections had already been held in late 1994.
“IMF members accepting the obligations of Article VIII undertake to refrain from imposing restrictions on the
making of payments and transfers for current international transactions or from engaging in discriminatory cur-
rency arrangements or multiple currency practices without IMF approval” (see IMF Press Release Number 96/42,
July 25, 1996, at http://www.imf.org).
“ESAF is a concessional IMF facility for assisting eligible members that are undertaking economic reform
programs to strengthen their balance of payments and to improve their growth prospects. ESAF loans carry an
interest rate of 0.5 percent per annum, and are repayable over 10 years, with a 5-1/2-year grace period” (see IMF
Press Release Number 96/55, November 25, 1996, at http://www.imf.org)
The total three-year credit had an original equivalent of SDR 161.6 million and was approved in three annual
loans of SDR 51.4 million in November 1996, SDR 71.4 million in December 1997 (including an SDR 20 million
increase to deal with the effects of the 1996/97 drought), and SDR 58.8 million in February 1999 (augmented by
SDR 20 million to deal with the effects of the 1997/98 El Niño floods). Tanzania joined the IMF in 1962. Its
current quota is SDR 146.9 million (see IMF Press Releases Numbers 96/55, 97/54, and 99/6 at http://www.imf.org).
“Under Article IV of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, the IMF holds bilateral discussions with members,
usually every year” (see IMF Public Information Notice 99/28 from March 31, 1999, at http://www.imf.org).
despite the severe economic disruptions caused by adverse weather conditions” (IMF
1999). In particular, the executive directors welcomed the continuous overall growth,
increasing gross reserves, strong fiscal stance, tight monetary policies, and recent struc-
tural reforms, namely, introduction of the VAT on July 1, 1998; the effectiveness of the
government’s cash management system; and the progressing privatization of parastatal
entities. However, the positive indications of an ongoing economic transition process
and the first signs of improved macroeconomic stability should not detract from the
indisputable necessity of further joint efforts between Tanzanian authorities, interna-
tional financial institutions, and bilateral donors to promote further reform. A first prom-
ising sign of continual joint endeavor is the IMF’s consideration of Tanzania’s eligibil-
ity under the HIPC Initiative (IMF 1999).
Whatever the next multilateral loan is called
and under which facility it might be scheduled, in the short and medium term Tanzania
will depend heavily on another phase of international financial, as well as technical,
assistance until its administrative capacity and economic structure allow for a more
self-reliant and sustainable development path.
Economic Performance and Policies Applied under Structural Adjustment
This section provides an overview of Tanzania’s economic performance under struc-
tural adjustment, focusing on recent developments, followed by a detailed description
of sectoral, structural, and macroeconomic policies implemented during this period.
General Economic Performance
. According to the
Policy Framework Paper for 1998/
99–2000/01
, published in January 1999, the general performance of the Tanzanian
economy under the ERP 1996/97–1998/99 was satisfactory (IMF 1999; URT, IMF,
and World Bank 1999; World Bank 1999b).
Since the mid-1990s, the Tanzanian
government has pursued substantial structural policy reforms to achieve further trade
liberalization, enhanced fiscal consolidation, streamlining of the civil service sector,
privatization of parastatals, tight monetary growth, better delivery of social services,
and poverty alleviation. Even though the 1996/97 drought and the 1997/98 El Niño
floods had a negative effect on economic performance, real per capita income im-
proved between 1995 and 1998, while inflation declined and the external position
continued to strengthen.
Government savings were about 1 percent of GDP for both
Tanzania’s eligibility under the HIPC Initiative may be decided at the upcoming midterm review of the current
ESAF arrangement.
Tanzania’s serious commitment to the transition process and the actions that have been taken to implement the
economic reforms are summarized in Appendix Table A.2.
The description of the current economic performance of the Tanzanian economy in this section draws heavily on
the Policy Framework Paper 1989/99–2000/01,
Public Information Notice Number 99/28 of the IMF, and Press
Release Number 99/6 of the IMF, the most recent official documents available
According to the most recent available data in
World Development Indicators 2000
, GDP per capita, measured at
purchasing power parity in current international dollars, increased from 461 to 472 to 473 to 480 for the years
1995–98; annual inflation with respect to consumer prices decreased from 28.4 to 21.0 to 16.1 to 12.8 percent
during the same period; and the trade deficit in constant 1995 U.S. dollar decreased from US$984 million to
US$800 million to US$589 million to US$417 million during 1995–98 (World Bank 2000b).
fiscal years; inflation was at an annual rate of 12 percent by the end of June 1998 and
7 percent by the end of December 1999, the lowest rate in 20 years; international
gross reserves increased by more than 10 percent and outperformed the target of an
equivalent of three months of imports of goods and nonfactor services (4.1 months by
the end of December 1999); and the Tanzanian shilling nominally depreciated by
only 7 percent against the U.S. dollar during 1997/98, which translates into a real
appreciation given the inflation rate of 12 percent during this period. However, agri-
cultural growth was far below target, mainly because of climate-related factors, and
total GDP growth of 3.4 percent in 1997/98 could only be achieved through much
higher growth in some nonagricultural sectors;
exports declined by 19 percent in
1997/98; the current account deficit, excluding official transfers, increased to 14.2
percent of GDP; and government revenue fell by 1.2 percentage points to 12.3 per-
cent of GDP (IDA/IMF 2000).
GDP Development.
The growth of GDP at factor costs during the prestructural
adjustment period was characterized by high volatility. After moderate GDP growth
from independence in 1961 until 1976, the average annual growth rate sank to 1
percent in 1977 and 1978, then recovered to previous levels in 1979 and 1980, and
finally became negative in 1981 (–0.5 percent) and 1983 (–2.4 percent). However,
in 1984 and 1985, the two last years before the implementation of the ERP, GDP
growth was 3.4 and 4.6 percent, respectively, which amounts to an increase of 5.8
percentage points from 1983 to 1984.
GDP increased substantially after implementation of the 1986 ERP, but
collapsed during the early 1990s, the second term of the Mwinyi government
(Figure 2.1). Following implementation of the 1996 ERP, GDP growth regained
levels that translate into positive per capita growth, but remained below targets,
mainly because of adverse weather conditions during FY 1996/97 and 1997/98.
In FY 1998/99, GDP continued to grow at the previous year’s level, and for the
two following fiscal years it was projected to grow between 5.2 and 5.9 percent
per year.
Although these growth rates look promising at first sight, Tanzania’s popula-
tion continues to grow at high annual rates.
Furthermore, with a real GDP per
capita of current US$129.50 in 1995, which translates into a US$461 purchasing
power parity, Tanzania has one of the lowest per capita GDP levels in the world. It
requires substantial and continuous growth over a medium-term horizon even to
reach the still poor SSA average of about US$500 in real GDP per capita (UNDP
1996; URT 1995c; URT 1996b; World Bank 1996b
Agricultural GDP growth slowed from 4.8 to 3.2 to 2.2 percent between 1996 and 1998, but still contributed
between 46 and 48 percent to total value-added during this period (World Bank 2000b).
Even though the population growth rate decreased by 0.1 percentage points annually during 1994 to 1998 from
3.0 to 2.6 percent, it still shows extremely high levels that constitute the gap between the real GDP growth rate and
the per capita growth rate. If the annual real GDP growth rate falls below 2.6 percent, the per capita growth rate
will be negative. However, this is not a well-substantiated figure, because the last census was in the mid-1980s.
As mentioned in the
UNDP Development Co-operation 1995 Report
agriculture remains the most important source of economic growth, but some
nonagricultural activities show promising growth rates as well, especially the
mining and tourism sectors:
The positive growth performance in the economy was due mainly to strong
growth in the agricultural sector, which comprised 55.2 percent of GDP and
which experienced real growth of 7 percent during the year, but was shared
by almost all sectors except public administration, construction and manu-
facturing. The economy’s positive performance can be seen in the following
sectors: Mining and Quarrying (5.9 percent); Electricity and Water (4.4 per-
cent); Wholesale/Retail Trade, Hotels and Restaurants (5.7 percent); Trans-
port and Communications (9.3 percent); and Finance, Insurance, Real Estate
and Business Services (8 percent) (UNDP 1996, pp. 20–21).
Because of unfavorable weather conditions during the 1996/97 and 1997/98
cropping seasons and other potential setbacks in agricultural production for external
Figure 2.1—Annual growth rate of GDP at factor costs, 1989–99
Source: BOT (1991):
Economic Bulletin
, vol. 29, no.3, Table 1.9.
Note: Figures are for total GDP at constant 1992 prices for the Tanzanian mainland, including an ap-
proximately 27 percent share of nonmonetary GDP for the relevant period. In consideration of an annual
population growth rate of 2.8 to 3.0 percent, all total GDP growth rates lower than 2.8 to 3.0 percent trans-
late to negative per capita GDP growth rates.
or internal reasons, the shift from dominating growth in agriculture to dominating growth in nonagriculture continued in 1996–98.
Price and Market Reforms.
In the context of the 1986 ERP, an additional Agricultural
Adjustment Program was formulated to complement the macroeconomic adjustment
process and generate a sufficient supply response. The main objectives of the pro-gram were to
(1) liberalize the marketing and pricing of food grains,
(2) initiate the liberalization of the major export crop markets,
(3) remove the monopoly export power of the crop marketing boards,
(4) restructure parastatals in agriculture, and
(5) improve the efficiency of export crop tenders and auctions and crop processing
industries (World Bank 1994a). Most domestic market controls on food crops were
abolished in 1989, including the restrictions on the marketing and transportation of
food grains. Producer prices for the main agricultural products were liberalized be-
tween FY 1991/92 and FY 1993/94. The marketing of nontraditional export crops
was also liberalized in the late 1980s. In 1990 this liberalization was extended to
traditional export crops such as coffee, tobacco, cashews, and cotton. During the
1991/92 marketing season, private traders were allowed to buy cashew nuts, and in
1993 private marketing of all major traditional export crops was permitted. The list of
items subject to price controls was reduced from 400 to 2—petroleum products and
electricity—throughout the liberalization process. In addition to price and market
liberalization of agricultural commodities, subsidies for agricultural inputs such as
fertilizer were phased out (World Bank 1996b).
Import Rationing
. Permission to import from own funds—foreign currency depos-
ited abroad—was given in 1984 and accounts for one-third of total imports today. In
the context of the 1986 ERP, quantitative import restrictions were replaced with a
system of open general licenses (OGLs). The negative list for imports under the OGLs
was substantially reduced in 1992, and the share of nonoil imports subject to licens-
ing under the OGLs was only 20 percent of total nonoil imports. In July 1993 the
OGL negative list was further reduced and included goods for health or security rea-
sons or because they were considered luxury goods. In February 1994 the negative
list was further shortened and restricted to health- and security-related goods; crude
petroleum and luxury goods no longer require import licenses (World Bank 1996b).
Tariff Rates
. Before June 1988 the tariff system contained 20 different rates
with a maximum tariff of 200 percent. The system was reduced to four nonzero
tariff rates by 1990, and the maximum tariff rate was steadily reduced to 50
percent in July 1994 and to 30 percent in June 1997.
Despite the rate reduc-tions, the share of collected import duties in total tax revenue increased from an
The effective tariff schedule as of July 1996 is ad valorem for most items with four bands at 5, 10, 20, and 30
percent. Capital goods are taxed at 5–10 percent, and intermediate and consumer goods are taxed at 10–30 percent
average of 14.1 percent during the prereform period 1981/82–1985/86 to 26.3
percent during the reform years of 1986/87–1995/96 (URT, IMF, and World
Bank 1999; World Bank 1996b). This substantial increase primarily reflects
increased import volumes, but may also reflect more efficient tax collection
following the tariff rate harmonization.
Export Taxes
. Export taxation was suspended in 1982 and reintroduced with the 1996/
97 budget for traditional goods (cotton, coffee, tobacco, tea, sisal, cashew nuts, and
minerals) at a rate of 2 percent of their export value. Its expected contribution to total
revenue collection was estimated at TSh 1,800 million or 0.3 percent.
The reintroduction of an export tax on traditional export agriculture increased
the degree of taxation of agriculture yet again, compounding other financial bur-
dens placed on agricultural producers, such as the increase in the minimum wage,
increased duties on imported assembled vehicles, stamp duty (1 percent), and
contributions to crop marketing authorities. Consequently, many producers are
concerned about how agricultural products will sustain increased competitive-
ness in international markets (see Tanzanian government 1996/97 budget sum-
mary in Coopers and Lybrand 1996).
Input Subsidies
. Fertilizer prices were highly subsidized during the preadjustment
period. Because of subsidization, farmgate prices fell by around 50 percent between
1976 and 1984. Although explicit subsidies were abolished in 1984, “repeated
currency devaluation overtook the increases in the fertilizer selling price permitted
to the Tanzania Fertilizer Corporation so that by 1988/89 there was an implicit
subsidy of up to 80 percent” (World Bank 1994b, p. 78). From 1990/91 onward
the subsidy was phased out with 70, 55, 40, and 25 percent for the respective
fiscal years and with zero subsidy since 1994/95. The elimination of fertilizer
subsidies in combination with continued inflation and subsequent currency
devaluation caused rapid increases in local input prices for the different varieties
of fertilizer. In 1991/92, for example, the domestic market prices for fertilizer (in
nominal terms) rose an average of 85 percent and from 32 to 91 percent in 1992/
However, despite these sharp price increases, the supply of fertilizer in the
mid-1990s still did not meet demand, mainly as a result of extremely poor supply channels (World Bank 1994b).
Exchange Rate Policy and Foreign Exchange. The exchange rate was effectively unified in August 1993 when the official rate was set on the basis of rates prevailing in the foreign exchange auction introduced in July 1993. The foreign exchange
Taken from a speech on FY 1996/97 by the minister for finance (see URT 1996b).
The official monthly minimum wage increased from TSh 17,500 to TSh 30,000 in July 1996.
The GDP deflator for this period ranges around 30 percent inflation annually.
market was further liberalized when the auction was replaced by an interbank mar-
ket for foreign exchange in June 1994.
Furthermore, the surrender requirement on proceeds from nontraditional ex-
ports was abolished in July 1993 and for traditional exports (except coffee) in June
1994. The exchange system for payments and transfers for current international
transactions has been completely liberalized, and no limits are imposed on current
payments and transfers.
Administrative controls on imports have been removed,
and trade restrictions on foreign exchange remain only for petroleum products and
a few goods restricted for health and security reasons (URT, IMF, and World Bank
1999; URT, IMF, and World Bank 1996).
Table 2.1 presents the exchange rate development of the Tanzanian shilling
since 1985 when the first ERP was implemented. The shilling experienced rapid
devaluation between 1985 and 1989, followed by two years of mild depreciation
and two years of moderate depreciation before the exchange rate market was fully
liberalized in 1993/94. Since that time depreciation of the exchange rate shows a
stable path at low levels. The liberalization of the foreign exchange market not only
contributed to this stability, but improved political circumstances as well. The in-
fluence of the 1995 national elections on monthly exchange rate figures for 1995
and 1996 is shown in Table 2.2.
The first free and democratic elections in Tanzania under a multiparty system
were held in October 1995. From a stable position during the first four months of
1995, the exchange rate depreciated during the pre-election period and then
reappreciated after the elections, which restored the former united CCM party and
elected Benjamin Mkapa as the new president.
Domestic Tax Policies.
Total tax revenue declined substantially from prereform
years until the first half of the 1990s. Tax revenues as a share of GDP declined
during 1982–86 (16.5 percent), 1987–92 (14.2 percent), and 1993–96 (13.1 per-
cent). Weaknesses in tax administration and the proliferation of exemptions caused
the worst performance in FY 1992/93, with a revenue-GDP ratio of only 11.4 per-
cent. The decline in performance was also caused by structural changes in the
economy, as the composition of output shifted toward sectors that were more diffi-
cult to tax. For example, the GDP share of manufacturing and mining declined
throughout the 1980s, while the GDP share of agriculture and the nonmonetary
informal sector both increased
A measure that is in accordance with the obligations of Article VIII, Sections 2, 3, and 4, of the IMF Articles of
Agreement, accepted by Tanzania in July 1996.
This information is based on BOT 1998,
Economic Bulletin
for the quarter ended September 30, 1998, vol. 28,
no. 3, Table 4.3; OANDA (1999), Classic 164 Currency Converter, available at http://www.oanda.com, accessed
May 30, 1999; and the author’s calculations.
Data on domestic tax policies are based on IMF (1996b); Coopers and Lybrand (1994, 1995); Tanzanian govern-
ment budget summary 1994/95, 1995/96; and World Bank (1996b).author’s calculations.
ficial mean selling rates for U.S. dollars in
Tanzanian shillings for the end of each period. Data are rounded to the closest integer
for the quarter ended December 31, 1996.
Note: Exchange rates are of
ficial mean selling rates for U.S. dollars in
Tanzanian shillings for the end of each period. Data are rounded to the closest integer
Domestic sales tax revenues declined from 8.2 percent of GDP during the
prereform period to 3.6 percent of GDP during the reform period, while income tax
revenues declined from 5.1 to 3.6 percent for the same periods. Although trade tax
collection improved from 2.3 percent to 3.6 percent of GDP for these periods, the rise
could not compensate for the losses in income and consumption taxes, which consti-
tute more than 60 percent of total tax revenue for the periods under consideration.
Before the reform period, the sales tax schedule contained more than 26 rates
with a maximum rate of 300 percent. Until 1995, the number of sales tax rates was
gradually reduced first to seven and then only two ad valorem rates for imported and
domestic goods (25 and 30 percent) and three rates for services (5, 10, and 15 per-
Excise duty, generally 30 percent, is levied on petroleum products, alcoholic
beverages, cigarettes, cosmetics and perfumes, and soft drinks. Since 1992/93 sev-
eral measures have been applied to simplify the confusing tax structure, and tax rates
have been substantially reduced. The list shown in Appendix Table A.4 summarizes
the major steps of tax reforms in the 1990s.
Agricultural Stocking Behavior
. The national Strategic Grain Reserve holds a total
stock of 150,000 tons of staple food crops for emergency situations. Because Tanza-
nia generally has a positive overall food balance, the annual emergency grain pro-
curement targets can usually be fulfilled by domestic production. Tanzania does not
rely on regular annual shipments of food aid. However, the adverse weather condi-
tions of two recent cropping seasons (the 1996/97 drought and the 1997/98 El Niño
floods) forced the government to request international assistance under the Food and
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations/World Food Programme (FAO/WFP).
Since early 1998, three FAO/WFP crop and food supply assessment missions have
taken place to monitor the situation and implement assistance measures
Foreign Aid and Private Capital Flows
. Throughout the first 10 years of struc-
tural adjustment between 1986 and the end of 1995, Tanzania accumulated a total
medium- and long-term external debt of US$6.3 billion. About 50 percent of this
debt was owed to bilateral official creditors, 40 percent to multilateral creditors,
3 percent to the IMF, and the remaining 7 percent to private financial institutions
and suppliers. The major multilateral creditor was IDA, to whom Tanzania owed
US$2.2 billion, 35 percent of its total debt, or 75 percent of its total multilateral debet
During 1991–95, Tanzania borrowed on extremely concessional terms with
an average commitment structure as follows: interest rate of
1.3 percent per year,
repayment period of 36 years, grace period of 9 years, and a grant element of
about 70 percent (IMF 1996a
Some goods bear specific rates, however.
For detailed information, refer to the three special reports on the
FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment
Mission to Tanzania,
February 19, 1998; August 3, 1998; and February 15, 1999 available at http://www.fao.org.
Detailed information on the composition of the external debt can be found in World Bank 1996b, pp. 26–32.
Throughout the 1996 ERP period, Tanzania received substantial foreign as-
sistance, and its debt position continued to worsen. The total debt stock reached
nearly US$8 billion in 1996/97, or some 110 percent of GDP. Public debt service
of US$316.3 million in 1996/97 was equivalent to 25.2 percent of export earn-
ings. The IMF estimates total debt in 1998/99 at a similar absolute level as in
1996/97, even after the debt relief that followed recent IMF negotiations and the
rescheduling of flows in accordance with the Naples terms of the Paris Club agree-
ment. Assuming strong GDP growth, total debt will fall below 100 percent of
GDP, and total public debt services will amount to 21.6 percent of export earn-
ings instead of 29.1 percent without debt relief.
43 The comparison of Tanzania’s debt situation before and after the 1996 ERP
reveals that the overall debt situation hardly improved through the SAPs. As soon as
Tanzania regained the attention of the international donor community through its
good governance and the application of reform policies, its balance of trade position
deteriorated because of a new foreign capital influx. Tanzania has to be extremely
careful in deciding where to invest this additional capital. A substantial share of this
capital should be invested in sectors that will yield significant profits. In the long
term, this should result in a reduction in the country’s overall national indebtedness.
Land Policies
(IMF1996b; URT 1995b; World Bank 1996b)
.The land surface of main-
land Tanzania is approximately 881,300 square kilometers, while the islands of Zanzi-
bar and Pemba make up an additional 2,000 square kilometers. Inland lakes comprise
another 61,500 square kilometers. With the exception of a few mountains, most of the
country forms a plateau at 1,020 to 1,650 meters above sea level. Forty-six percent of
the total land area is forests and woodlands, while 40 percent is permanent pasture.
44 Although Tanzania has about 487,100 square kilometers of potentially arable land, 1992 Ministry of Agriculture statistics show that only 10.1 percent of this area
is under cultivation. Of this area, nearly 93.4 percent (46,000 square kilometers) is
used for small-scale farming by landholders who cultivate the land mainly under
customary tenure. The remaining 6.6 percent is used for large-scale farming under
granted rights of occupancy.
Figure 2.2 shows the actual land use of the total mainland Tanzania area,
including water areas, accounting for 942,800 square kilometers. Only 3 percent of
the total mainland Tanzania area is cropped, although an additional 6 percent is
considered suitable for arable farming.
43 For the most recent figures on Tanzania’s debt situation and for a 15-year projection, see URT, IMF, and World
Bank 1999. Because neither GDP nor foreign trade development can be projected reliably and because it is equally
difficult to assume the volumes of loans throughout this period, these projections are somewhat arbitrary; how-
ever, a total debt stock representing only 52.4 percent of 2015/16 GDP while paying just 7.7 percent of export
earnings in public debt service tempts one to hope.
44 For a detailed description of the nine different physiographic regions and the seven different agroecological
zones in Tanzania, refer to Appendix Table A.3.
24 Although land in Tanzania is not scarce, within the arable and cultivated areas
the country faces increasing problems, such as soil fertility losses, soil erosion,
deforestation, water pollution, and the development of industry and mining. The
increasing pressure led to the adoption of a sustainable National Land Policy (NLP),
which the cabinet approved in March 1995. The NLP declares that “all land in
Tanzania is public land vested in the President as trustee on behalf of all citizens.”
The policy allows the individualization of village land, stating that “individuals
should be allowed to obtain individual titles within areas not designated for” other
uses (URT 1995b, p. 7). The NLP is viewed as an instrument of compromise to help
heal the myriad grievances that have come to characterize land policy in Tanzania.
Its success in making land tenure more secure will depend on how it is imple-
mented. The most serious challenge to the NLP’s implementation is the lack of
administrative capacity and information, including insufficient land survey data.
However, compared with many other developing economies dominated by ag-
riculture, Tanzania has a relative abundance of land and has some unexploited poten-
tial for future land use. Environmentally friendly and economically sustainable land
use is all the more important as land ownership is the single most important safety net
in Tanzania: 98 percent of all rural households own some land—5.18 acres on aver-
age according to the 1995 rural Participatory Poverty Assessment (PPA) survey.
Credit Policy—Rural Credit.
Eighty-nine percent of the villages surveyed in the
1995 rural PPA survey mentioned lack of credit as a constraint to agricultural
production. A total of 58.7 percent of households in the lowest expenditure quintint
Water
Pasture
Parks
Game
Cropped
Arable
Forest
Figure 2.2—Land use in mainland Tanzania
Source: World Bank (1994b).
25 and 39.1 percent in the highest quintile reported that credit was not available
during the 1993/94 season. The main sources of credit for those who did borrow
were family, friends, traders, trade stores, private moneylenders, or cooperatives.
Farmers in the lowest quintile borrowed to buy seasonal inputs (fertilizer, agro-
chemicals, and seeds). Farmers in the highest quintile borrowed primarily to hire
labor to work on their land. Commercial credits in rural areas are relatively rare.
In the PPA survey, 57 of 77 village focus groups that participated had no knowl-
edge of the Cooperative and Rural Development Bank or the National Bank of
Commerce, and 65 groups did not know about the postal bank (World Bank 1994b).
Private Banks.
Even though the Financial and Banking Institution Act was approved
in 1991, the first two private banks in Tanzania began operating only in late 1993.
Their operations concentrated on trade financing and mobilizing foreign exchange
deposits, mostly in the Dar es Salaam area. Five new private banks and several
other private financial institutions have entered the market since mid-1995 and
expanded private banking operations. The market share of private banks in domes-
tic credit increased from about 3 percent in June 1994 to almost 30 percent in Au-
gust 1996. The share of private banks in deposit mobilization rose from about 12 to
23 percent during the same period.
Interest Rate Structure.
Both deposit and lending rates were deregulated in 1994.
As a result, lending rates at first rose, but then fell below their pre-1994 levels.
Unlike the lending rates, deposit rates edged down in 1995 because of predic-
tions of a lower inflation rate. They have continued to fall steadily since de-regulation, and their 1997 and 1998 levels did not even compensate for infla-
tion. Comparing actual saving and lending rates reveals that while saving is
hardly worthwhile, borrowing for investment purposes is fairly expensive and
can be profitable only when marginal returns to investment exceed interna-
tional levels. Table 2.3 details the development of the interest rate structure
between 1992 and 1998. General Domestic Credit Performance.
During the last five years, the restructur-ing of parastatal enterprises has had a significant influence on credit performance. The importance of parastatal restructuring to the health of Tanzania’s financial system is evident in that until 1990, about 80 percent of the loan portfolio of the
National Bank of Commerce consisted of loans to only 20 borrowers, of which
19 were parastatal enterprises.
Political liberalization in Tanzania from 1986 and onwards
STATE OF POLITICAL PARTIES
Seventeen years after the dawn of liberal democracy Tanzania is still suffering from the hangover of a single party rule. Indicators are many. Tanzania is still largely a one party-state within a multiparty political system. Politics is still dominated by the one party generation most of them in their late sixties and above. Political leadership in both the ruling and opposition political parties is still in grip of the old guards with the ‘dot.com generation’ waiting in the periphery.
The transition to multiparty democracy in Tanzania continues to be frustrated by several factors including institutional weaknesses in practically all political parties as manifested by the lack of party philosophy or ideology, the functioning of party structures and processes, lack of participatory internal democracy due to deficit of communication between party leaders, followers and the population,
Lack of resources and the dominance of personality cult together with the infiltration in politics by wealthy individuals [wafadhili wa vyama] funding political parties with sole aim to maintain the status quo are other factors holding political development in Tanzania.
The other often ignored factor is lack of grassroots demands for political reforms on the parties considering that all political parties started from above and mostly in urban centers and have done very little to reach the grassroots especially in the rural areas where 87 per cent of the population live. Furthermore, the electoral system [winner takes all], which not only leaves out smaller parties but also disproportionately rewards the ruling party with seats in Parliament and hence more funding; and the refusal to allow private candidates is equally levying a cruel tax on democracy.
There are so many impediments holding back a smooth transition towards a competitive political culture; and if the five by-elections held since 2000 are anything to go by, it is easy to predict that next year’s general election results are likely to remain the same in favor of the ruling party.
Even then however, recent studies by Afrobarometer indicate positive trends. While the Nyalali Commission had 77 per cent of the respondents wanting to cling to the outdated single party rule, by 2003 that position had swung in favor of liberal democracy with 68 per cent of the respondents now saying multiparty was useful. Equally important, while only 29 per cent of respondents say they were far away from political parties 72 per cent say they are very close to political parties – an indicator that parties have a huge following in the country.
Political parties constitute the mechanism par excellence of democratic transition. However, to be effective political parties must meet four criteria. These are continuity, that is, a life span exceeding the dominance of party’s founders, a nationwide organization, the desire to exercise power [kushika hatamu or dola], and consistent efforts to garner significant popular support.
If these four variables were used to measure the growth of political parties in Tanzania, it is clear not more four can qualify to be called political parties. Already political parties like Popular National Party [PONA] and Tanzania Peoples Party [TPP] collapsed with the death of the founding chairman in the case of PONA; and departure of its founder in the case of TPP. Even the deregistration from the Registrar of political parties book was a mere routine job.
Similarly, there are parties that are basically political platforms for single individuals, built on structures whose rules can readily be changed to suit its founder; whose money and charisma are its main engine. This is the case with United Democratic Party [UDP] of John Cheyo; National Democratic League [NLD] of Emmanuel Makaidi; Democratic Party [DP] of Christopher Mtikila; Tanzania Labour Party [TLP] led by Augustine Mrema and Tanzania Democratic Alliance [TADEA] led by Lifa Chipaka.
Most of the political parties in Tanzania also fall short of the mark on the second count. A nationwide organization. UDP is very much tied to Magu the home district of its chairman while DP, NLD and TADEA operate from the founders’ homes.
THE RULING PARTY
Since the advent of multipartyism, the ruling Chama cha Mapinduzi [CCM] party has not only declined to de-link the civil service from the party, but has continued to enjoy, with impunity, exceptional support from state machinery. Chama cha Mapinduzi continues to deploy the services of regional and district administration, police and state security [Usalama wa Taifa] to organize, manage and utilize state funds for what are purely party events, including elections.
Most significantly, CCM uses these state structures to relay party messages and directives including the hosting of top party leadership as most of them double as party and state leaders – the case of Regional and District Commissioners and Cabinet Ministers. What this means is that the cost of performing many of the expensive party tasks is borne by state on behalf of the party. The common argument is that “Hii ni Serikali ya CCM” [this is CCM government] or “Hiki ni Chama chenye Dola” [it is the party in power].
Likewise, the ruling party and its government have refused to provide civic education as recommended by the Nyalali Commission because an informed population works to its disadvantage. Little wonder in all but one of the five by-elections held since 2000 have been won by the ruling party. Even in the Tarime constituency where it lost, the seat was already in the hands of the opposition, Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo [CHADEMA].
Notwithstanding these advantages, the ruling party is on the verge of disintegration or split mostly because of political corruption especially in the electoral process both within the party and its affiliates and also in the national elections. Unlike in the past when election funding was met by the party itself – as those wielding economic power were isolated from the party – the dawn of liberalism has opened the floodgate to private mobilization of election funds. Apparently this is done without any policy regulation in place. Those hitherto labeled as economic saboteur [wahujumu] have now been brought back into the fold as party donors [wafadhili].
With the rise of an extremely rich class of people, shrewd politicians have been quick to embrace these tycoons who are ready to bankroll party elections to advance their business interests. The end result is that only those with money to bribe voters are likely to be nominated and elected. Those who fail will have to defect to the opposition or else split the giant party into CCM-A and CCM-B. If this were to happen political analysts are in agreement that it will be a blessing in disguise as it will tilt the balance of power in favor of the opposition.
The failure of the government to put in place a policy regulation on election funding is already levying a cruel tax on government coffers as an alliance of business tycoons and politicians is corrupting the bureaucracy leading to looting of public funds.
Another notable feature in the ruling party is the struggle between the old guards [represented by Yusuf Makamba – the current Party Secretary General] and younger generation [represented by Nape Nnauye]. The struggle is so strong to the extent that it may break up the party. The old guards – some of whom have been in power since independence – want to hang on while the younger generation wants to push them out.
THE TROUBLED OPPOSITION
One common feature of the leadership in the opposition political camp is that it is not markedly different from the ruling party. The opposition is also being led by the same social stratum born and nurtured by mono political system. This is why it has borrowed the same single party categories, instruments, structures and terminologies in the struggle against the ruling party hegemony. There is very little that deviates the opposition political parties from the dominant party so much so that average, ordinary people do not see the difference.
This also explains why almost all the opposition political parties have been riddled with internal leadership struggles and defections back to the ruling party something that has contributed to eroding voter confidence in the emerging parties.
In terms of popularity of the opposition political parties the graph has not remained constant. Some parties have gained while others have lost. During the first multiparty general elections in 1995, NCCR-Mageuzi under the leadership of Augustine Mrema was the most popular opposition party after the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi followed by Civic United Front under Professor Ibrahim Lipumba and United Democratic Party [UDP] under John Cheyo.
However, by 2005 the pendulum had swung in favor of CUF which came second after CCM followed by Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo [CHADEMA] under Freeman Mbowe with Mrema’s Tanzania Labour Party [TLP] trailing very far behind. While the popularity of CUF has continued to increase, that of NCCR-Mageuzi, UDP and TLP has continued to decline. The only exception is CHADEMA which has recently become very popular.
The thrust of CHADEMA on graft and corruption in the corridors of power has proved to be an effective stick from which to beat the ruling party and around which it has been able to mobilize huge following. This is the only political party which is expected to offer a stiff challenge to the ruling party on the Mainland in next year’s general elections.
Other opposition political parties exist only in name some without even offices, leadership,
There are various reasons to explain the impotence of the opposition political parties in Tanzania. These include the selective affinity of the State towards the ruling party – hence the unfair competition and unleveled play ground. The opposition still faces many hurdles in their effort to penetrate the politics in the country, major among them being their leadership qualities.
The internal factors holding back the growth of the opposition in Tanzania range from intra-party conflicts, lack of financial resources, organizational weaknesses, lack of administrative capacity and leadership.
It is quite proper that every party leader has the ambition to become the country’s next president. This kind of ambition provides a strong motivation for party leaders to utilize their best skills and resources to project a good image of the party – and its capacity. The problem, however, arises when organizational standards are sacrificed at the altar of personal ambition. It is a culture that promotes the attitude of indispensability of party leaders that holds their followers to ransom and threatens the party with collapse if those leaders are replaced.
The leadership crisis in both TLP and UDP emanates from this single factor. Much as internal elections have been held with the same leaders retaining their seats, the fact of the matter is that the parties have become weaker and unpopular. The same story applies to NCCR-Mageuzi and to some extent CUF.
Autocratic leadership boosted by efforts to revolve personality cult as the central basis for political authority has taken firm grip of nearly all the opposition political parties in the country.
Hence replacement of party leadership is not only resisted but often it is never contemplated. If serious efforts are made to replace party leadership, the result is a split of the party. TLP for example is riddled with leadership wrangling mostly involving attempts to replace Mrema through the ballot box.
This kind of approach to political organization creates a monumental problem for any bids for the institutionalization of democracy, in that, able and better skilled leaders cannot emerge to take up the party leadership mantle.
The decline of the opposition in Tanzania is basically due to the following factors: intra party conflicts, lack of party organization skills, lack of resources, and intrusion by agents from the ruling party [mamluki], together with lack of internal democracy. A combination of these factors together with a suffocating legal framework characterized by the domineering of the state administrators in rural areas have made it very difficult for them to penetrate into the rural areas and elicit grassroots support.
THE STATE OF CIVIL SOCIETY
The role of civil society in any political setting cannot be underestimated. These are training grounds for democratic citizenship and development of political skills of their members. They recruit new political leaders, stimulate political participation and educate the broader public on a wide variety of public interest issues. In their watchdog role, they serve, along with the press, as checks on the relentless tendency of the state to centralize its power and to evade civic accountability and control.
Tanzania is yet to benefit from a vibrant civil society because of passivity, self-interest and poor state of the economy, lack of organizational capacity and lack of public awareness. Much as Tanzania enjoys a plethora of civil organizations in all areas many of them are weak, elite-oriented, urban-based and survive through external donations. The danger of this kind of dependency is that, they will vanish from existence the moment foreign donation ceases and more importantly they are dancing to the tune of bank rollers.
The civil society in Tanzania is further weakened by the law, which prohibits them from politicking, because that is the sole work of political parties. Interestingly even leaders of the political parties who stand to gain a lot from civil societies have not gained the courage to challenge the bad law. Tanzania has a long history of excluding trade unions, cooperative societies, students’ groups, women organizations and professionals from politics – since their absence make it much easier to cut deals across party line. A typical example is how members of Parliament are able to increase their salaries and other allowances almost at will. STATE OF THE UNION
Even with over twenty commissions being formed during the past two decades to deal with Union crisis, the problem lingers on. In fact there are more complaints now than ever before. While in the past it was on the structure of the Union it is now on resources.
Zanzibar is complaining that the Union Government was allocating to itself all foreign aid. It is also complaining that revenue generated from minerals was not being apportioned to the isles. This latter issue recently triggered a huge debate both inside and outside the House of Representatives. The common position is that since Zanzibar does not benefit from revenues generated from the minerals sector then oil and gas discovered in the Isles must belong to Zanzibar alone. That is to say oil and gas business is not a Union matter.
Another lingering problem relates to the position of Zanzibar President in the Union pecking. While under the 1964 Articles of the Union the President of Zanzibar is automatically the Vice President of the Union Government, changes made to accommodate multiparty system in which union presidential candidates must have running mates relegates him/her to the post of mere Cabinet Minister in the Union Government. This has infuriated those in Zanzibar arguing that it was unconstitutional.
They are equally very vocal when it comes to the question of Constitutional Court, which has not been institutionalized since 1964. Their line of argument is that had this institution been in place most of the past and current problems could have been solved.
Another area that has attracted complaints from Zanzibar relates to the position of Zanzibar in the East African Community [EAC]. Those in the isles think they were being unrepresented and that most decisions were being made in Dar es Salaam without consultations as if Zanzibar was not a state in its own right.
Mainlanders on their part have always complained against the inclusion of Zanzibar Ministers in the non-union ministries saying this was wrong as there was no Mainlander in the Zanzibar Cabinet.
It is clear unless the 1964 Articles of Union remain the grundnorm or unless there is a referendum with free voting on what type of the Union Tanzanians want, the Union question will one day become a political crisis as was the case with the G55 in 1992.
Apparently both the Union Government and Zanzibar leadership have decided to remain silent in order to buy time.
INFLUENCE OF FOREIGN POWERS
With an almost 100 per cent dependency on external funding for her development budget Tanzania has completely lost her independence. This explains the country’s why President is always abroad [seven trips to the US within two years] soliciting for more aid. The influence of foreign powers in Tanzania’s political system is so huge to the extent that the country has completely lost not only its ability to make decisions but also direction. The external factor is not only directed at the state but also to the emerging civil society many of which are out there to meet the interests of funding partners.
External social engineering means that the country’s future will not be determined by internal dynamics but rather the external factors. This
has led to what is referred as management by crisis. Apparently Tanzania switched to liberal politics with pressure from external powers. If this is the case it goes without saying that the country is prone to political crisis [due resistance], and therefore requires carefully externally directed political intervention in order to consolidate and expand the level of freedom and stability.
THE FUTURE
Tanzanians will next year go for their fifth multiparty general elections. Given the foregoing it is clear the ruling party will retain power not because of its popularity in terms of policy programs but rather through its muscle power [the power of the purse] and intrigues. However, given the recent upsurge of CHADEMA, the ruling party will retain power with a reduced number of MPs and Councilors.
With CCM retaining power, Tanzania will continue to be externally engineered. This is because the CCM government lacks capacity to manage state affairs combined with a weak economic base. Internal democracy within CCM will continue to be dominated by more intrigues due to political corruption which has penetrated the party at all levels with the party and its government lacking the capacity to uproot it among its ranks.
As society becomes more stratified and interest groups emerge which do no longer find satisfaction within the current arrangement, one may also predict instability thus killing the myth that Tanzania is a peaceful and stable country. The emergence of Islamic militants and evangelical revivalism, witchcraft, armed robbery, corruption and the looting of public funds by public servants are clear indicators of what is to come – lawlessness and hence survival of the fittest.
The Union question is another thorny issue which will continue to steer political instability especially from Zanzibar. Part of the problem is that the current leadership has no interest in finding a lasting solution; unless it is coerced by external donors.
In this lecture we have surveyed the market economy of Tanzania from 1986, and political liberalization onward.
ACTIVITIES
1. Discuss the implication of SAPS on Tanzania economy.
2. Discuss the rationale of re-introduction of multiparty system.
3. Examine the problems which are facing political parties in Tanzania
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